How did you perceive Merz’s speech in Münster?

At first, I thought it was perverse to award NATO this Münster Peace Prize. But I consider Merz’s trip to Kyiv to be more important. Two points are crucial for me. Firstly: he is now calling for talks and peace negotiations with Russia. He makes no mention of a ceasefire. That is a major difference.

As recently as June, the federal government and Parliament were saying that Russia was losing the war and would be forced to the negotiating table – on our terms, that is. Later, following Russian military advances, an immediate, unconditional ceasefire was demanded: first a ceasefire, then negotiations.

Now, in Kyiv, Merz is talking about peace negotiations without making a prior ceasefire a condition. He discusses this at length in the transcript. This is no passing remark. Perhaps we are seeing here a certain acceptance of the realities that have emerged as a result of the war.

The second point concerns the European Union. Merz discusses with Zelenskyy a form of association between Ukraine and the EU, whilst Zelenskyy has so far insisted on full membership. At the same time, Merz calls for reforms regarding the rule of law and the fight against corruption, and links these to further payments from the EU.

Ukraine is under enormous financial pressure, and further aid is being made conditional. That is a qualitative difference.

That is why I consider this visit to be important. Despite Merz’s political weakness, a course may have been set here that even a successor would not easily reverse.

What is the situation in Ukraine?

The situation is dire for Ukraine. In my view, the great danger is that it will become a ‘failed state’, that is, a state in a state of disintegration. When state structures collapse, militias or regional groups often take control. For a European state, that would be a disaster.

That is why negotiations are so important. We must try to preserve the Ukrainian state and keep it functioning. This requires talks with Russia.

So do you see a change of direction on Merz’s part? Away from his previous stance and more towards negotiations?

What he said there certainly does not match his previous rhetoric. I cannot imagine that was unintentional. I hope the Russians take note of this too. Because we must get to the negotiating table. Otherwise, there is a risk that an increasingly devastated state will lie between Russia and us, from which people are leaving because they no longer see a future.

I have seen many wars and know how much the population suffers as a result. That is why we must negotiate, above all in the interests of Ukraine. We have a responsibility to ensure that the Ukrainian state can survive and remain functional. To achieve this, Germans and Russians must talk to one another again.

Do you get the impression that there is already a plan behind Merz’s remarks, one that has been coordinated with others?

No, I don’t think so. It is currently almost impossible for the German government to negotiate with Russia. Germany would, however, be one of the biggest beneficiaries of a peace agreement or settlement with Russia in Europe.

To negotiate in earnest, one would have to recognise that this is not just about territorial issues, but also about Russian security interests, in particular NATO enlargement.

Then Ukraine’s neutrality would probably also be put on the table. This raises the question: why, then, has this war been waged for so long? Could certain matters not have been negotiated earlier, for example in Istanbul?

The question of blame would then also be framed differently. I am not saying that Russia bears no blame. But the notion that one’s own side is entirely free of responsibility would then be difficult to maintain. For governments, such a step is politically very difficult.

How can talks even begin when the German government is hardly in a position to do so and the EU is not pursuing a corresponding line either? Are there already contacts?

At the UN, the initial task in such situations is to ensure that both sides can even talk to one another. This requires mediators or shuttle diplomacy.

In the war in Ukraine, this is particularly difficult because four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are involved: the US, the UK, France and Russia. The UN Secretary-General’s options are therefore limited.

Another option is what we at the United Nations have referred to as ‘Grey Beards’: former ministers or other figures who previously held important positions but no longer hold government office.

Such individuals can build a bridge between the two sides. They are close to the governments but enjoy greater freedom.

Are there any concrete efforts to initiate such talks? Or is this just an idea for the time being?

I have discussed such ideas in Russia, and there is a general interest there. I do not wish to say any more on the matter at the moment, as that would involve naming names.

Such talks must be carefully prepared. Specific topics are needed. One must begin with issues on which there is common ground. One such point of common ground between Germany and Russia could be the realisation that, after two world wars, German and Russian soldiers should never again wage war against one another.

Ultimately, Europe must discuss the European security order with Russia. In my view, there will be no lasting peace in Ukraine without an understanding of Russia’s security interests.

When you speak of ‘us’, do you mean Germany, the EU or the US as well?

Primarily the European Union. Perhaps Germany could take a leading role in this. We are trying to take the lead militarily – why not in the pursuit of peace as well?

I could imagine that Austria, for example, might be interested in this. Germany and Austria would benefit greatly from a normalisation of relations with Russia.

I do not believe that we Europeans should hide behind American negotiations. This war is taking place on European soil. It concerns the European security order and Ukraine as an important European state.

The US has other interests. My experience in Afghanistan was that the Americans conducted their talks with the Taliban largely on their own and sometimes only informed the Europeans at a late stage – they found out about it from the newspapers.

Europe itself must have a fundamental interest in restoring peace to the European continent.

Do you get the impression that this view is shared in Europe? If one looks, for example, at Kaja Kallas, the Baltic states or the military manoeuvres, the signals seem rather to suggest the opposite.

Of course. That is why I find what Merz said remarkable. In my view, the European Union is on the wrong track on this issue.

At the same time, financial support for Ukraine is increasingly being discussed. I therefore believe that the war in Ukraine will also change the EU. After this war, it will no longer be the same as before – at least not in the form that Ursula von der Leyen envisages.

I am by no means anti-European. But I have spent many years of my professional life assessing wars, including within the Security Council. Such an assessment can never be purely military. One must also consider which political doors are opening and which are closing.

This war is on a larger scale than many conflicts I have dealt with in the past. But certain mechanisms remain the same.

As President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen could actually place greater emphasis on mediation. Instead, we often hear her taking a very hard line. What do you think is driving her?

In my view, this was driven by the idea that the European Union could become a third major centre of power in a multipolar world, alongside the US and China.

At the same time, it was assumed that Russia would be severely weakened by this war. The idea was that the conflict would bring the EU closer together politically and enable it to become a major power in its own right. This calculation has not panned out.

Instead, Russia will emerge from this war as a significant power, whilst the European Union is losing influence on the international stage.

Would you describe Merz’s speech as a significant turning point towards negotiations?

I would put it more cautiously. There are noteworthy statements in this speech that we must keep an eye on.

If what Merz hinted at there is confirmed, it would mark a qualitative shift from previous policy. This concerns Ukraine’s future integration into the EU, further financial aid and, above all, peace talks with Russia.

Whether Merz will actually pursue this line remains to be seen.

Do you believe that Russia is interested in ending the war and in negotiations?

When the EU says that Russia does not want to negotiate, it often means: Russia does not want to negotiate on the terms we have set.

The Western conditions included, amongst other things, a complete Russian withdrawal, reparations, a special tribunal and the possibility of Ukrainian NATO membership.

For its part, Russia demands that the outcomes of the war and its territorial claims be accepted. Even more important from Russia’s perspective are Ukraine’s neutrality and extensive military restrictions.

The positions are therefore very far apart. The crucial question is not: ‘Does anyone want to negotiate or not?’, but rather: ‘On what terms is one side prepared to enter into negotiations?’.

Nevertheless, someone has to prepare such talks. Are you confident that serious contacts are already taking place behind the scenes?

No, I am not confident of that.

But the mere statement that one wants talks and peace negotiations is already a step in the right direction. How such talks are actually organised is another matter. In my view, Germany lacks a great deal of experience in this regard.

At the same time, things need to move quickly. With every passing day of the war, the situation in Ukraine deteriorates.

What exactly would a ‘failed state’ in Ukraine mean?

It would mean there is no longer a functioning government capable of effectively controlling the whole country.

The country could fragment into different regions and spheres of influence. We have seen similar situations in Libya, Syria and Somalia: formally, a central government may still exist, but it no longer controls large parts of the country.

That would be a catastrophic development for Ukraine and for Europe.

Are there forces within Ukraine that also recognise this danger and wish to chart a different course?

I cannot make a definitive judgement on that. I am still in contact with Ukrainians. My impression, however, is that there, too – including amongst parts of the opposition – there is a considerable denial of reality.

This is not unusual in wars. But without a sober assessment of one’s own situation, it is impossible to develop a strategy.

Ukraine has suffered enormous demographic losses; millions of people have left the country; there are dead and war-wounded; and the infrastructure continues to be destroyed. One must therefore ask what a realistic war aim could possibly look like today.

In my view, Europe now has a greater interest in a peace settlement than is often acknowledged.

For me, the question remains as to how far your interpretation of Merz can actually be translated into political consequences.

That is why I am cautious about it. If one compares his statements made at different times, the language has changed.

In a war, it is fundamental whether one initially demands an unconditional ceasefire or speaks directly of peace negotiations. Equally crucial is whether one believes one can defeat the opponent militarily and force them to the negotiating table on one’s own terms – or whether one accepts that a compromise will be necessary.

I have had a great deal to do with negotiations in my professional life. That is why this shift strikes me as remarkable. I cannot imagine that it is entirely coincidental.

So do you think Merz had a specific purpose in mind?

Yes. The fact that he is addressing this in such detail is no coincidence.

His statements on Ukraine’s future relationship with the EU, the conditions for further financial support and his remarks on talks with Russia are important points.

Whether he can actually develop a new policy from this is another matter. Merz and his government are under political pressure.

Ultimately, in a war, developments on the battlefield also determine policy.

Final question: Do you believe that, despite European involvement in the war, Russia remains interested in a viable post-war European order? Or have relations become too poisoned by now?

Yes, I believe there is interest on the Russian side.

I have travelled to Russia twice on my own initiative. I deliberately did not accept any official invitations because I wanted to remain independent. Nevertheless, it was possible to hold high-level talks there.

From this I conclude that there is a fundamental interest. The crucial question is whether a willingness to engage is also emerging on the German and European side.

That is why I find Merz’s remarks interesting. Perhaps a small window of opportunity has opened up there.

In wars, one must keep an eye out for such changes. Nobody opens a wide window straight away, because each side is afraid of showing weakness. I do not wish to overestimate this. But I believe there is something noteworthy about this speech.

The questions were asked by Michael Maier.